揭穿恶作剧重建TCP连接和进程之间的关联

小咪咪 2022-11-29 12:30 115阅读 0赞

是时候将把戏揭穿了。

请先阅读下文：  
[https://blog.csdn.net/dog250/article/details/108113329][https_blog.csdn.net_dog250_article_details_108113329]

依照文章中所描述的把戏，我们hack一下两个进程的tcp连接的归属，首先给出hack之前的情景：

[root@localhost ~]# netstat -ntp
    Active Internet connections (w/o servers)
    Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State       PID/Program name
    tcp        0      0 192.168.56.110:22       192.168.56.1:55287      ESTABLISHED 1344/sshd: root@pts
    tcp        0      0 192.168.56.110:22       192.168.56.1:55589      ESTABLISHED 4791/sshd: root@pts

然后，在实施hack之后，进程所属的tcp连接被交换了：

[root@localhost ~]# netstat -ntp
    Active Internet connections (w/o servers)
    Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State       PID/Program name
    tcp        0      0 192.168.56.110:22       192.168.56.1:55287      ESTABLISHED 4791/sshd: root@pts
    tcp        0      0 192.168.56.110:22       192.168.56.1:55589      ESTABLISHED 1344/sshd: root@pts

如果系统运维或者其它管理员遇到这样的情况，他们到底要瞄准哪个进程来debug呢？

注意⚠️，我们要抛弃事后的预设，事实上，他们根本无法意识到连接被交换了，等到拉了一大堆人一起开完会后很久，他们或许才能意识到事情哪里有点不对劲。

如果有我在，这种事情就不会发生，作为手艺人，我更喜欢直接面对本质，而不是使用工具迂回，在我看来，通过procfs来查找tcp连接和进程之间的关联，就是迂回。

何不直接点儿呢？

来看下面的图：  
![在这里插入图片描述][watermark_type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk_shadow_10_text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L2RvZzI1MA_size_16_color_FFFFFF_t_70_pic_center]  
如果通过那条 ***不可拆除的线索*** 来关联tcp\_sock和socket，岂不是无需迂回？

OK，下面的代码描述了如何做：

#!/usr/bin/stap -g
    // tcpstat(.stp)
    
    %{ 
    #include <net/tcp.h>
    #include <linux/fdtable.h>
    
    struct result { 
    	char laddr[16];
    	char raddr[16];
    	unsigned short	lport;
    	unsigned short	rport;
    	unsigned long	ino;
    	int pid;
    	char comm[32];
    };
    
    static inline void ip2str(char *to, unsigned int from)
    { 
    	int size = snprintf(to, 16, "%pI4", &from);
    	to[size] = '\0';
    }
    
    void traverse(struct sock *sk, unsigned long ino, struct result *ret)
    { 
    	struct task_struct *tsk;
    	int i;
    
    	for_each_process(tsk) { 
    		struct file *file;
    		for (i = 0; i < tsk->files->fdt->max_fds; i++) { 
    			file = tsk->files->fdt->fd[i];
    			if (file == NULL) { 
    				continue;
    			}
    			if (file->f_inode->i_ino == ino) { 
    				char laddr[16], raddr[16];
    
    				ip2str(laddr, inet_sk(sk)->inet_rcv_saddr);
    				ip2str(raddr, inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr);
    
    				memcpy(&ret->laddr[0], laddr, 16);
    				memcpy(&ret->raddr[0], raddr, 16);
    				ret->lport = sk->sk_num;
    				ret->rport = htons(sk->sk_dport);
    				ret->ino = ino;
    				ret->pid = tsk->pid;
    				memcpy(&ret->comm[0], tsk->comm, 32);
    			}
    		}
    	}
    }
    %}
    
    function dump_tcp_info()
    %{ 
    	struct task_struct *tsk;
    	struct inet_hashinfo *hashinfo = &tcp_hashinfo;
    	struct hlist_nulls_node *node;
    	struct socket_alloc *sa;
    	struct sock *sk;
    	struct result ret;
    	int i, ino;
    
    	for (i = 0; i < INET_LHTABLE_SIZE; i++) { 
    		struct inet_listen_hashbucket *ilb;
    
    		ilb = &hashinfo->listening_hash[i];
    		sk_nulls_for_each(sk, node, &ilb->head) { 
    			unsigned long ino;
    
    			sa = (struct socket_alloc *)sk->sk_socket;
    			ino = sa->vfs_inode.i_ino;
    
    			traverse(sk, ino, &ret);
    			STAP_PRINTF("LISTEN %s:%d inode:%d/[%d] %s\n",
    						ret.laddr,
    						ret.lport,
    						ret.ino,
    						ret.pid,
    						ret.comm);
    		}
    	}
    
    	for (i = 0; i <= hashinfo->ehash_mask; i++) { 
    		struct inet_ehash_bucket *head = &hashinfo->ehash[i];
    
    		if (hlist_nulls_empty(&head->chain)) { 
    			continue;
    		}
    
    		sk_nulls_for_each(sk, node, &head->chain) { 
    			unsigned long ino;
    
    			sa = (struct socket_alloc *)sk->sk_socket;
    			ino = sa->vfs_inode.i_ino;
    
    			traverse(sk, ino, &ret);
    			STAP_PRINTF("ESTABLISHED %s:%d %s:%d inode:%d/[%d] %s\n",
    						ret.laddr,
    						ret.lport,
    						ret.raddr,
    						ret.rport,
    						ret.ino,
    						ret.pid,
    						ret.comm);
    		}
    	}
    %}
    
    probe begin
    { 
    	dump_tcp_info();
    	exit();
    }

来来来，我们运行上面的脚本来试一下能不能把被hack的系统真相找出来：

[root@localhost test]# ./tcpstat
    LISTEN 0.0.0.0:22  inode:22852/[1001] sshd
    LISTEN 0.0.0.0:22  inode:22850/[1001] sshd
    ESTABLISHED 192.168.56.110:22  192.168.56.1:55287 inode:25510/[1344] sshd
    ESTABLISHED 192.168.56.110:22  192.168.56.1:55589 inode:28747/[4791] sshd

用这个结果来对比一下被hack后的情形：

[root@localhost ~]# netstat -ntp
    Active Internet connections (w/o servers)
    Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State       PID/Program name
    tcp        0      0 192.168.56.110:22       192.168.56.1:55287      ESTABLISHED 4791/sshd: root@pts
    tcp        0      0 192.168.56.110:22       192.168.56.1:55589      ESTABLISHED 1344/sshd: root@pts

哈哈，真相大白！

何为手艺人？不依赖大型工具，不依赖专业知识，小镇上修锅换底而无痕迹者是也。当然，皮鞋也能做。

--------------------

浙江温州皮鞋湿，下雨进水不会胖。

[https_blog.csdn.net_dog250_article_details_108113329]: https://blog.csdn.net/dog250/article/details/108113329
[watermark_type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk_shadow_10_text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L2RvZzI1MA_size_16_color_FFFFFF_t_70_pic_center]: /images/20221124/e8b7e5741a1441dbb8b08806139f283d.png