POODLE Vulnerability: Padding Oracle on Downgraded Legacy Encryption

秒速五厘米 2022-08-03 11:38 109阅读 0赞

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**POODLE** abbreviates to **P**adding **O**racle **O**n **D**owngraded **L**egacy **E**ncryption. This vulnerability was discovered by **Bodo Möller**, **Thai Duong** & **Krzysztof Kotowicz** from the **GOOGLE** security team and published [ here][here]. I'm using the information published in this article as a reference for this blog post. This vulnerability has been listed in [**NVD**][NVD]; here is the link: [ CVE-2014-3566][CVE-2014-3566]. Microsoft also has released a security bulleting on this issue: [ https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/3009008.aspx][https_technet.microsoft.com_library_security_3009008.aspx]

As the name suggests,  **POODLE** exploits the design flaws of the legacy cryptographic protocol  **SSL 3.0**.

*  **Secure Socket Layer 3.0** or **SSL 3.0** is a legacy cryptographic protocol which is a predecessor to **TLS**. It is considered obsolete and insecure due to many flaws in its design. For more technical details refer [RFC 6101][].
 *  **Transport Layer Security** or **TLS** is a successor to **SSL**. There were several security flaws and design issue in SSL which lead to development of **TLS 1.0 (**also sometimes referred to as **SSL 3.1)**. **TLS 1.0** provides a fall-back mechanism to **SSL 3.0** so that clients/servers which are not compatible with **TLS1.0** can use **SSL 3.0**.

<table style="border-collapse:collapse; background:#bdd6ee"> 
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 <td style="padding-left:7px; padding-right:7px; border-top:solid 1.5pt; border-left:solid 1.5pt; border-bottom:solid 1.5pt; border-right:solid 1.5pt"> NOTE: SSL 2.0 alsoexists which is a predecessor to SSL 3.0. These are the version of SSL or TLS drafted till date: 
 <ol> 
 <li>SSL 2.0</li> 
 <li>SSL 3.0</li> 
 <li>TLS 1.0 (version field 3.1)</li> 
 <li>TLS 1.2 (version field 3.2)</li> 
 <li>TLS 1.2 (version field 3.3)</li> 
 </ol> </td> 
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*  **Protocol Negotiation** – The SSL/TLS protocol handshake allows the client and server to negotiate the latest protocol version common to the client and the server. If during negotiation if they fail to use TLS then they fall-back to **SSL 3.0**.

The **POODLE** attack exploits the fall-back mechanism to downgrade a secure connection to **SSL 3.0** and then breaks the cryptographic security of **SSL 3.0** to steal sensitive data such as **HTTP** cookies, **HTTP** Authorization header contents etc.

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 <td style="padding-left:7px; padding-right:7px"> How does POODLE work? </td> 
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To understand this attack knowledge of CBC mode encryption is required. Refer this post of mine to understand how this works: [ http://blogs.msdn.com/b/kaushal/archive/2011/10/03/taming-the-beast-browser-exploit-against-ssl-tls.aspx][http_blogs.msdn.com_b_kaushal_archive_2011_10_03_taming-the-beast-browser-exploit-against-ssl-tls.aspx]

**SSL handshake**: [ http://blogs.msdn.com/b/kaushal/archive/2013/08/03/ssl-handshake-and-https-bindings-on-iis.aspx][http_blogs.msdn.com_b_kaushal_archive_2013_08_03_ssl-handshake-and-https-bindings-on-iis.aspx]

Almost all of the clients that exist today support **SSL 3.0** and provide a fall-back mechanism from **TLS 1.0** to **SSL 3.0** (*This downgrade purely exists for backward compatibility for legacy clients/servers*). It uses this downgrade option to implement **Man-in-the-Middle** attack to exploit a vulnerability in **SSL 3.0**.

Many clients/servers have a fall-back mechanism to work with legacy server/clients. During the SSL handshake, the client offers the highest protocol version supported by it, if this is not supported on the server, then server responds with what is supported and re-attempts the handshake. However there is a problem with the fall-back mechanism from **TLS 1.0**à**SSL 3.0**. This fall-back can also be triggered by network glitches or by an attacker who resides in between client and the server.

Once the attacker has succeeded in downgrading the connection to **SSL 3.0**, he proceeds ahead. SSL 3.0 like any other protocol supports **RC4 stream ciphers** and **block ciphers** in  **CBC** mode. **RC4** is considered to be not secure; refer this blog post to know why: [ http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/03/attack-of-week-rc4-is-kind-of-broken-in.html][http_blog.cryptographyengineering.com_2013_03_attack-of-week-rc4-is-kind-of-broken-in.html]

**On the security of RC4 in TLS & WPA**: [http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/][http_www.isg.rhul.ac.uk_tls]

Also read this wiki article: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RC4][http_en.wikipedia.org_wiki_RC4]. Refer to section [**Roos' biases and key reconstruction from permutation**][http_en.wikipedia.org_wiki_RC4]and**[Biased outputs of the RC4][http_en.wikipedia.org_wiki_RC4]** which explains the problem in **RC4**.

Coming to the CBC mode encryption in SSL 3.0, it has a serious flaw. Its block cipher padding is not deterministic, and not covered by the **MAC** (Message Authentication Code). As a result of this the encrypted text is exposed to the **Man-in-the-middle** attack which uses oracle padding to retrieve the encrypted text. This has been well explained in the article I outlined earlier. Below, is a snippet of the [article from Google Security team][here] explaining the attack in detail:

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 <td style="padding-left:7px; padding-right:7px; border-top:solid 0.5pt; border-left:solid 0.5pt; border-bottom:solid 0.5pt; border-right:solid 0.5pt"> The most severe problem of CBC encryption in SSL 3.0 is that its block cipher padding is not deterministic, and not covered by the MAC (Message Authentication Code): thus the integrity of padding cannot be fully verified when decrypting. Padding by 1 to L bytes (where L is the block size in bytes) is used to obtain an integral number of blocks before performing blockwise CBC (cipher-block chaining) encryption. The weakness is the easiest to exploit if there's an entire block of padding; which (before encryption) consists of L-1 arbitrary bytes followed by a single byte of value L-1. To process an incoming ciphertext record Ci…Cn also given an initialization vector C0 (where each Ci is one block), the recipient first determines Pi… Pn as Pi = Dk (Ci) ⊕ Ci-1, 1 (where Dk denotes block-cipher decryption using per-connection key K), then checks and removes the padding at the end and finally checks and removes a MAC. Now observe that if there's a full block of padding and an attacker replaces Cn by any earlier ciphertext block C from the same encrypted stream, the ciphertext will still be accepted if Dk (Ci) ⊕ Cn-1 happens to have L-1 as its final byte, but will in all likelihood be rejected otherwise, giving rise to a padding oracle attack [tls-cbc]. In the web setting, this SSL 3.0 weakness can be exploited by a man-in-the middle attacker to decrypt "secure" HTTP cookies; using techniques from the BEAST attack (BEAST). To launch the POODLE attack (Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption), run a JavaScript agent on evil.com (or on <a href="http://examplecom/" rel="nofollow">http://examplecom</a>) to get the victim's browser to send cookie-bearing HTTPS requests to <a href="https://example.com/" rel="nofollow">https://example.com</a>, and Intercept and modify the SSL records sent by the browser in such a way that there's a non-negligible chance that example.com will accept the modified record. If the modified record is accepted, the attacker can decrypt one byte of the cookies. Assume that each block C has 16 bytes, C[0]…C[15]. (Eight-byte blocks can be handled similarly.) Also assume for now; that the size of the cookies is known. (Later we will show how to start the attack if it isn't) The MAC size in SSL 3.0 CBC cipher suites is typically 20 bytes, so below the CBC layer, an encrypted POST request will look as follows: POST /path Cookie: name=value… \r\n\r\nbody || 20-byte MAC || padding The attacker controls both the request path and the request body, and thus can induce requests such that the following two conditions hold: 
 <ul> 
 <li>The padding fills an entire block (encrypted into Cn).</li> 
 <li>The cookies' first as of-yet unknown byte appears as the final byte in an earlier block (encrypted into Ci)</li> 
 </ul> The attacker then replaces Cn by Ci and forwards this modified SSL record to the server. Usually, the server will reject this record, and the attacker will simply try again with a new request. Occasionally (on average, once in 256 requests), the server will accept the modified record, and the attacker will conclude that Dk (Ci)[15] ⊕ Cn-1[15]=15, and thus that Pi[15] = 15⊕ Cn-1[15] ⊕ Ci-1[15]. This reveals the cookies' first previously unknown byte. The attacker proceeds to the next byte by changing the sizes of request path and body simultaneously such that the request size stays the same but the position of the headers is shifted, continuing until it has decrypted as much of the cookies as desired. The expected overall effort is 256 SSL 3.0 requests per byte. As the padding hides the exact size of the payload, the cookies' size is not immediately apparent, but inducing requests GET /, GET /A, GET /AA, … allows the attacker to observe at which point the block boundary gets crossed: after at most 16 such requests this will reveal the padding size and thus the size of the cookies. </td> 
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The attack is pretty much similar to **BEAST** as it uses the oracle padding attack. However unlike  **BEAST** there is no work-around mechanism or a fix that can be deployed to fix this vulnerability in **SSL 3.0**.

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 <td style="padding-left:7px; padding-right:7px"> Workaround/Solution </td> 
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The attack works by establishing a secure connection using **SSL 3.0**. Therefore, one could simply disable the **SSL 3.0** protocol at their end to safeguard themselves against this attack.

However if the client/server supports only **SSL 3.0** then there is no workaround. The Google security team has submitted a draft which suggests the **TLS\_FALLBACK\_SCSV** mechanism to address the protocol downgrade problem. They have already implemented this in their own products. Read this article for more details: [ http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00][http_tools.ietf.org_html_draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00]

So to summarize, to protect against this attack one has to disable SSL 3.0 on the server/client. I will summarize the steps for doing this on **IIS 6** and higher, **Microsoft Azure Web Sites**,  **Firefox**, **Chrome** and **IE**.

**For IIS Web Server (version 6.0 and higher)**

Note that **IIS** relies on the cryptographic implementation provided by  **Windows** (**SChannel**) for secure communication (**HTTPS**). So IIS uses the **SChannel** component to implement **HTTPS** communication with various clients.

1.  Click **Start**, click **Run**, type **regedit**, and then click **OK**.
2.  In Registry Editor, locate the following registry key (if not present you can create it)
    
    **HKey\_Local\_Machine\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\SCHANNEL\\Protocols\\SSL 3.0\\Server**
3.  On the **Edit** menu, click **AddValue**.
4.  In the **DataType** list, click **DWORD**.
5.  In the **ValueName** box, type **Enabled**, and then click **OK**. 
6.  Type **00000000** in Binary Editor to set the value of the new key equal to "**0**".
7.  Click **OK**. Restart the computer.

Another way to do this is:

*  Launch **notepad.exe**
 *  Copy the below in to notepad:

*  Save the file as disablessl3.reg (*Note that the file extension is **.reg***)
 *  Double click this file. 
 *  You would receive a prompt saying it is going to make changes to the registry. Click on **OK**.
 *  Restart the computer for the changes to take effect.

**For Microsoft Azure Web Sites**

**SSL 3.0** has been disabled by default for all sites running on **Azure Websites**. The product group has published a blog on how to disable this for **AzureVM** and **Cloud Services**:

[http://azure.microsoft.com/blog/2014/10/19/how-to-disable-ssl-3-0-in-azure-websites-roles-and-virtual-machines/][http_azure.microsoft.com_blog_2014_10_19_how-to-disable-ssl-3-0-in-azure-websites-roles-and-virtual-machines]

**For Internet Explorer**

Similar to **IIS**, **IE** also uses the **SChannel** component of Windows for cryptography and encryption. However it uses the client component of **SChannel**. To disable **SSL 3.0** for IE follow the below instructions:

1.  Launch **Internet Explorer**.
2.  Go to Tools  à**Internet Options**à**Advanced** tab.
3.  Scroll down to the bottom and here you will find the protocol list for IE. Uncheck **SSL 3.0**.
    
    ![1055.110414_5F00_0336_5F00_POODLEVulne1.png][]
4.  Click on OK and restart the browser for the changes to take effect.

**For Google Chrome**

Google Chrome will be removing support for SSL .30 completely in its upcoming versions. Read this for more details: [ http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com.au/2014/10/this-poodle-bites-exploiting-ssl-30.html][http_googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com.au_2014_10_this-poodle-bites-exploiting-ssl-30.html]

1.  Right click at your  **Chrome's** desktop icon and click on **Properties**
2.  At the end of the **target** field enter:  
    "** --ssl-version-min=tls1**" (*with space but without quotes*).
3.  Click on **Apply** and then click on **OK**.
    
    ![5661.110414_5F00_0336_5F00_POODLEVulne2.png][]
4.  Restart Chrome completely via the menu or with \[**Ctrl + Shift + Q**\]

**For Mozilla Firefox**

As per Mozilla security blog, SSL 3.0 will be disabled by default in **Firefox v34**, which will be released on **Nov 25th 2014**.

1.  For users who cannot wait, Firefox has released [ SSL Version Control][SSL Version Control] Firefox extension to disable **SSLv3** immediately. 
2.  Click on the above link and click on **Add to Firefox** button.
    
    ![4617.110414_5F00_0336_5F00_POODLEVulne3.png][]
3.  This doesn't require a restart.

The above extension changes the **security.tls.version.min** to **1**. There are 2 keys which govern the SSL protocol for **Firefox**. They are:

1.  **security.tls.version.min** specifies the minimum supported protocol version.
2.  **security.tls.version.max** specifies the maximum supported protocol version.

Both **security.tls.version.min** and **security.tls.version.max** currently range from **0** to **3**. If **security.tls.version.min** and **security.tls.version.max** are equal, only one protocol version will be supported. The behavior is undefined if **security.tls.version.min** is *larger* than the **security.tls.version.max** value.

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 <td style="padding-left:7px; padding-right:7px; border-top:none; border-left:none; border-bottom:solid #0070c0 1.5pt; border-right:solid #0070c0 1.5pt"> SSL 3.0 </td> 
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 <td style="padding-left:7px; padding-right:7px; border-style:none solid solid; border-left-color:rgb(0,112,192); border-left-width:1.5pt; border-bottom-color:rgb(0,112,192); border-bottom-width:1.5pt; border-right-color:rgb(0,112,192); border-right-width:1.5pt"> 1 </td> 
 <td style="padding-left:7px; padding-right:7px; border-top:none; border-left:none; border-bottom:solid #0070c0 1.5pt; border-right:solid #0070c0 1.5pt"> TLS 1.0 </td> 
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 <td style="padding-left:7px; padding-right:7px; border-style:none solid solid; border-left-color:rgb(0,112,192); border-left-width:1.5pt; border-bottom-color:rgb(0,112,192); border-bottom-width:1.5pt; border-right-color:rgb(0,112,192); border-right-width:1.5pt"> 2 </td> 
 <td style="padding-left:7px; padding-right:7px; border-top:none; border-left:none; border-bottom:solid #0070c0 1.5pt; border-right:solid #0070c0 1.5pt"> TLS 1.1 </td> 
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 <td style="padding-left:7px; padding-right:7px; border-style:none solid solid; border-left-color:rgb(0,112,192); border-left-width:1.5pt; border-bottom-color:rgb(0,112,192); border-bottom-width:1.5pt; border-right-color:rgb(0,112,192); border-right-width:1.5pt"> 3 </td> 
 <td style="padding-left:7px; padding-right:7px; border-top:none; border-left:none; border-bottom:solid #0070c0 1.5pt; border-right:solid #0070c0 1.5pt"> TLS 1.2 </td> 
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You can access the above mentioned keys in Firefox by typing **about:config** in the address bar. Enter **TLS** in the search bar to retrieve **TLS** related settings.

![3051.110414_5F00_0336_5F00_POODLEVulne4.png][]

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Hope this article helps. Provide comments, for any corrections.

原文：http://blogs.msdn.com/b/kaushal/archive/2014/10/22/poodle-vulnerability-padding-oracle-on-downgraded-legacy-encryption.aspx

[here]: https://www.openssl.org/~bodo/ssl-poodle.pdf
[NVD]: http://nvd.nist.gov/
[CVE-2014-3566]: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-3566
[https_technet.microsoft.com_library_security_3009008.aspx]: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/3009008.aspx
[RFC 6101]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6101
[http_blogs.msdn.com_b_kaushal_archive_2011_10_03_taming-the-beast-browser-exploit-against-ssl-tls.aspx]: http://blogs.msdn.com/b/kaushal/archive/2011/10/03/taming-the-beast-browser-exploit-against-ssl-tls.aspx
[http_blogs.msdn.com_b_kaushal_archive_2013_08_03_ssl-handshake-and-https-bindings-on-iis.aspx]: http://blogs.msdn.com/b/kaushal/archive/2013/08/03/ssl-handshake-and-https-bindings-on-iis.aspx
[http_blog.cryptographyengineering.com_2013_03_attack-of-week-rc4-is-kind-of-broken-in.html]: http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/03/attack-of-week-rc4-is-kind-of-broken-in.html
[http_www.isg.rhul.ac.uk_tls]: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
[http_en.wikipedia.org_wiki_RC4]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RC4
[http_tools.ietf.org_html_draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00]: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00
[http_azure.microsoft.com_blog_2014_10_19_how-to-disable-ssl-3-0-in-azure-websites-roles-and-virtual-machines]: http://azure.microsoft.com/blog/2014/10/19/how-to-disable-ssl-3-0-in-azure-websites-roles-and-virtual-machines/
[1055.110414_5F00_0336_5F00_POODLEVulne1.png]: /images/20220731/2ba43d2d629f47faba56650da265ff57.png
[http_googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com.au_2014_10_this-poodle-bites-exploiting-ssl-30.html]: http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com.au/2014/10/this-poodle-bites-exploiting-ssl-30.html
[5661.110414_5F00_0336_5F00_POODLEVulne2.png]: /images/20220731/261ad5742596434182640026b10ac24f.png
[SSL Version Control]: https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/ssl-version-control/
[4617.110414_5F00_0336_5F00_POODLEVulne3.png]: /images/20220731/b7eebfbc879d4d2fb36a23bdc960edb6.png
[3051.110414_5F00_0336_5F00_POODLEVulne4.png]: /images/20220731/d77ff82d3f634e6a8a1faeb5de077816.png